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WATER RIGHTS

Do "Navigable Waters'Incblde Wetlands?
by Robert H. Abrams

United States

v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.
(Docket No. 84-701)

Argued October 16, 1985
Congress. as provided in the Commerce Clause, has
power to regulate activities relating to the "navigable
waters of the United States." Over time. Congress has
extended the range of regulatory enactments passed
under this authority from regulation of navigation to
include pollution control. At times. Congress and administrative agencies acting pursuant to congressional
authorization have used this power to implement regulatory programs that govern fast land activities immediately adjacent to and directly affecting those navigable
waters.
ISSUES
In this case, the permissible scope of federal authority over navigable waters is challenged insofar as the
United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps)
seeks to regulate activities on upland wetlands. Such
determination will concentrate on powers granted the
Corps by section 404 of the federal Clean Water Act (33
U.S.C. sections 1251, etseq.).
Specifically, this case involves the power of the Corps
to prevent Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. (Riverside)
from filling a wetland adjacent to a navigable water of
the United States. The Supreme Court will be asked to
determine whether Riverside's property is properly categorized as wetlands under the Corps' Clean Water Act
regulations and, if so, whether regulating such wetlands
exceeds the scope of the Corps' authority.
FACTS
Riverside owns eighty acres of land in Macomb
County, Michigan. The land borders Black Creek, a
navigable tributary of Lake St. Clair. Lake St. Clair is a
navigable water of the United States; it is a connecting
lake between Lake Huron and Lake Erie located just
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north of Detroit. The parcel in question is alongside a
major thoroughfare that leads to Detroit in an area
where there are several residential subdivision developments. If filled, Riverside's land would be well-suited
for similar subdivision development.
In the litigation, Riverside and the Corps hotly contested issues relating to the character of the parcel involved such as whether, in its natural state, it was often
inundated by water. While the evidence seems mixed, it
;s clear that before this litigation arose, some parts of the
parcel had be en farmed and had hardwood growth
indicative of being uplands. Nevertheless, since 1973,
large portions of the parcel had been subject to periodic
inundation coincident with periods of high water levels
on Lake St. Clair. At least in part, the inundation of
Riverside's land was attributable to flood control and
drainage measures instituted by the Corps to protect
adjacent developed areas.
In mid-1976, an inexpensive source of fill material
became available and Riverside sought the necessary
permissions to fill the parcel. The local township
granted Riverside a fill permit. Simultaneously, Riverside consulted with the Corps in an effort to ascertain
whether newly-promulgated Corps' regulations required Riverside to obtain a permit from the Corps to
fill the property. No definitive response was obtained.
In late 1976, the local township formally informed Riverside that under the local zoning ordinance, failure to
fill the land as authorized constituted a nuisance and if
fill operations were not commended, Riverside would be
subject to substantial fines. Riverside began the filling
immediately and the Corps went to court to enjoin Riverside from proceeding without a permit issued by the
Corps.
The particular regulatory provision in issue has undergone a series of minor changes in wording since its
original promulgation. As the statutes and regulations
now appear, Corps' jurisdiction over fill operations pursuant to section 404 of the Clean Water Act extends to
all "wetlands" that are "adjacent" to navigable waters
and their tributaries. Importantly, Corps' section 404
jurisdiction extends to intrastate waters and isolated
wetlands if the use, degradation or destruction of those
areas could affect interstate commerce. The definitions
of "wetlands" and "adjacent" adopted by the Corps are
both quite broad-including within their scope lands
that are inundated or saturated with sufficient frequency to support typical wetlands vegetation.
PREVIEW
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As to most of the parcel, the Corps prevailed in
obtaining an injunction of Riverside's fill operations
until a Corps' permit was obtained. (A small portion of
the parcel consisting of lands above a specified elevation
were not held subject to the federal permit requirement.) A panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the decision, initially on the ground that the
Corps could not regulate the land by virtue of the pattern of vegetation present unless that pattern was caused
by "frequent flooding by waters flowing from 'navigable
waters [of the United States]' as defined in the [Clean
Water] Act." The Corps requested rehearing ell bane,
which was denied, but the original panel of judges issued a clarification of the previous opinion which found
that the Clean Water Act authorized no jurisdiction
whatever over wetlands.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Without regard to its outcome, the Riverside case is of
national interest. Section 404 jurisdiction over wetlands
potentially affects millions of acres of land in all fifty
states. Roughly 450,000 acres of wetlands are developed
each year, many of which are subject to the Corps'
claimed permitting authority under the present rules.
While there is little likelihood that the Corps would
exercise its permitting authority to inhibit development
activities on a large scale, there is equally little doubt that
the Corps can and does limit many wetlands-based projects under its currently asserted jurisdiction.
Environmentally, wetlands fill activities are a significant event. Wetlands serve as important habitat for
many species of waterfowl. Droughts in recent years
have inhibited natural reproduction of many of these
species. For example, it is estimated that nationwide, the
mallard duck population has decreased by 20% in the
last three years. To the extent that the Corps might
exercise its permit power to preserve wetlands, species
like the mallard would benefit. Wetlands also serve
other important functions in regard to moderating the
effects of flooding and serving as recharge areas for
underground water supplies. By using the section 404
permitting power to prevent loss of wetlands, the Corps
likewise provides flood control and water supply benefits to large segments of the population.
In contrast to the practical significance of the case,
the legal issues that must be decided are narrow and not
of general significance. Virtually all legal attention in the
case is focused on matters of statutory drafting and
construction of a single section of a single Act. Congress
can always enact a new provision. Thus, for example, if
the Supreme Court affirms the Sixth Circuit's decision
and holds the Corps without jurisdiction over wetlands,
it seems plain that Congress could, by resort to the
commerce power generally (as opposed to the power of
Congress over the navigable waters of the United
States), establish an identical federal regulatory power
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over wetlands as that now claimed by the Corps.
Whether Congress would have the political will to do so
is open to question, but the legal issue of power appears
to be fairly well settled.
ARGUMENTS

For the United States (Counsel, AlIne S. Mmy and EUeII J.
Durkee, Department e[justice, Washinglor" DC 20530,' teleplunie
(202) 633-2217)
1. The Corps was given implicit authority to determine
administratively the precise scope of its jurisdiction
under section 404 of the Clean Water Act.
2. Congress intended that the Clean Water Act be construed broadly to prevent discharges of pollutants,
including discharges caused by wetlands fill activities.
3. Congress intended that the term "navigable water" in
the Clean Water Act be given the broadest interpretation possible.
4. Congress considered and rejected attempts to limit
the scope of section 404 coverage of lands that are not
frequently inundated by water.
5. Congress intended that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters be subject to regulation under section 404
of the Clean Water Act.
6. The Corps' regulatory definition of wetlands based
on vegetation patterns is scientifically sound and promotes both Congress' water quality concerns and regulatory efficiency,
7. Any claim that exercising jurisdiction over wetlands
results in a taking of Riverside's property is premature in this case.
For Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. (Counsel of Record,
Edgar B. Washbllm, 144 Second Street, San Frat/cisco, CA
94188; telephone (415) 543·8131)
1. Congress conferred on the Corps jurisdiction over
"navigable waters" and did not use that term to mean
"adjacent wetlands" as well.
2. "Navigable waters" as used in the Clean Water Act
does not mean lands containing wet soils and covered
by certain types of vegetation.
3. Congress did not intend to authorize the Corps to
exercise power to control land lise; that police power
function is traditionally reserved to the states and
their political subdivisions.
4. If the delegation of authority to the Corps is as broad
as is claimed by the Corps, the delegation of authority
is an unconstiurtjonal delegation of the legislative
function by Congress.
5. Legislative history not coterminous with the initial
passage of section 404 of the Clean Water Act is not
relevant to that section's proper interpretation.
6. The Corps' interpretation of its own powers under
the Clean Water Act is entitled to little deference due
to the inconsistent claims of authority made by the
Corps at various times.
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7. The Corps' application of its definition of navigable
waters and adjacent wetlands to the Riverside parcel
is not supported by the facts, is arbitrary and is
therefore invalid.
8. The injunction of fill activities originally won by the
Corps amounts to a taking of Riverside's property.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support ofthe United States

A brief was filed by twenty environmental organizations and the states of Alaska, Florida and Michigan.
Another brief was filed by the states of California,
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Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont,
West Virginia and Wisconsin, as well as four units of
California state and local government.
In Support a/Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.
Briefs were filed by the Chamber of Commerce of
the United States; the Pacific Legal Foundation and two
other groups; Citizens of Chincoteague (Virginia) for a
Reasonable Wetlands Policy; the American Petroleum
Institute, and the Mid-Atlantic Developers Association.
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